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The government of Malaysia decided to establish a new dedicated agency for law 
enforcement in the Malaysian Maritime Zone, in addition to the existing 12 agencies. The 
agency was formally established in May 2004 with the enactment of the Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) Act of 2004 (Act 633). During its inception, the 
MMEA was intentionally placed under the Prime Minister’s Department in anticipation 
of having to overcome any potential obstacles, and to expedite all legal requirements and 
financial allocations within the stipulated 18-month operational readiness timeframe. The 
decision to place the MMEA under the supervision of the Prime Minister’s Department 
proved successful when the deadline was met, and the MMEA managed to commence 
operations in November 2005. 
The purpose of this project is to study the effectiveness of the MMEA as an 
operational agency for Law Enforcement and Search & Rescue under the Prime 
Minister’s Department. The project looks at the reporting line of structure for Coast 
Guards in the United States, India, New Zealand, and Japan, and makes comparisons with 
the MMEA. These findings will help identify the shortcomings in the MMEA and in 
particular explain the concept of inclusiveness for the MMEA to be successful and 
effective, as envisioned by its stakeholders. 
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In response to concerns about maritime security and enforcement, the government 
of Malaysia established the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) in 2004. 
Due to concerns about jurisdictional boundaries and administrative complexities, an act 
creating the MMEA placed it organizationally within the Prime Minister’s Department 
(PMD). The PMD consists of policy-making departments under the direct supervision of 
the prime minister, such as the Public Service Commission, Economic Planning Unit, 
Malaysian Administrative, Modernisation and Management Planning Unit, and the 
Islamic Development Affairs Department, among others. With the exception of the 
MMEA, the organizations within the PMD are all central agencies performing policy 
matters at the highest level of government. The MMEA is the only operational 
department for law enforcement and search and rescue (SAR) under the administration of 
the PMD. Of further concern is that many of the functions of the MMEA are duplicated 
within other agencies. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency has reduced or eliminated the duplication of functions of 
government agencies operating in the Malaysian Maritime Zone. One of the primary 
arguments for the establishment of the MMEA was to eliminate the overlapping roles of 
other federal, state, and local agencies. Because the MMEA has just operated for 10 
years, has the agency managed to overcome this problem, or is it just adding up the 
multiple agencies? This study looks at the effectiveness of the matured coast guards of 
the United States, New Zealand, India, and Japan, with emphasis on their lines of 
structure as federal agencies. The comparison will help the author analyze the managerial 
aspects of the various command structures in order to be operationally effective and 
minimize bureaucratic practices. 
 2 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
• What are the managerial challenges related to operational coordination for 
the MMEA after being established and in operation for 10 years? 
• How has the present structure of the MMEA under the PMD contributed 
to its operational efficiency in reducing duplication and improving 
command and control functions?  
• What are the strengths and weaknesses of the organizational structure and 
the operational perspective of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), 
Royal New Zealand Coastguard Inc. (CNZ), Indian Coast Guard (ICG), 
and Japanese Coast Guard (JCG)? 
• Are there any measures required for the MMEA’s operational 
improvement in relation to the best practices of the USCG, CNZ, ICG, and 
JCG? 
D. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study is to develop recommendations for the improvement of 
the operational efficiency of the MMEA. This study draws examples from similar 
agencies in the United States, New Zealand, India, and Japan with respect to lines of 
reporting and organizational structure. 
(1) Scope 
The research carries out the analyses to identify the similarities and differences 
between respective reporting lines during law enforcement and SAR in general, as well as 
during specific operations. It looks into optimizing the effectiveness of the MMEA’s 
operations by emulating best practices and structural strengths, and by learning from 
previous weaknesses experienced by the USCG, CNZ, ICG, and JCG.  
(2) Benefits of the Study 
The primary benefit of this study is to facilitate the government of Malaysia in 
assessing the earlier decision to place the MMEA under the PMD, and appraising the 
MMEA in its 10th year of establishment. Any assessment for the MMEA could be 
reactively done, which normally occurs in the aftermath of any major incident that would 
have tremendous implication directly to the government, or specifically to the MMEA, 
which could then be too late or inaccurate as a result of the sudden urgency to provide 
feedback. Therefore, a 10-year management review, or a proactive periodical insight of 
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this nature, can significantly and positively affect the MMEA’s performance from the 
lens of the ever-demanding stakeholders. This study critically focuses on the 
organizational factors that are equally crucial from the traditional overly dependent and 
vaguely described measurement, such as the key performance indicator.   
The secondary benefit is presented in the analysis chapter (Chapter III), which 
drives the MMEA to emulate the more established USCG, CNZ, ICG, and JCG, and 
subsequently support the aspiration of the government in its recently launched 
Government Transformation Programs (GTP). The comparison and analysis serves as a 
management tool and guidance for the MMEA to look again and realize its true potential 
based on the four different countries, and four different set-ups and from three different 
continents, which is intended to further propel the MMEA to becoming the sole agency 
for law enforcement and SAR at sea.  
E. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
This research is composed of four main chapters. In the literature review and 
institutional details chapter (Chapter II), the research provides background information 
about the definitions, overviews, and structures of government system in developed 
countries. The chapter also explains the creation of the MMEA, and the evolution of the 
coast guard, which concentrates on presenting the rationale behind the establishment of 
the USCG, CNZ, ICG, and JCG from four different federal systems. The chapter 
elaborates the challenges and roles of the USCG, CNZ, ICG, and JCG and focuses on 
each country’s organizational structures, chains of command, operations, and plans.  
In the analysis chapter (Chapter III), the author makes comparisons and illustrates 
the distinct positioning of the USCG, CNZ, ICG, and JCG within each respective 
government system in relation to the present set up of the MMEA and its chain of 
command. This is followed by various pros and cons for the coast guard as a government 
agency, or established as a voluntary organization outside the government system. This 
chapter further explains the potential problems and inefficiencies of the MMEA as a 
result of an intricate position within the PMD management structure.   
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Finally, in Chapter IV, the author makes recommendations for structural changes 
and reiterates the strengths and weaknesses of the present organizational structure, which 
helps the reader realize the importance of the checks-and-balances mechanism that 
improves efficiency instead of interfering with the MMEA.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
The literature review intends to study the reporting structure of other countries’ 
coast guards, which have been crucial in world’s maritime defense and development, in 
order to derive necessary recommendations that could be effective for the MMEA’s 
future. The description of the Malaysia government system is discussed, clarifying the 
roles of ministries with common interest in the MMEA. The Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA), Ministry of Transport (MOT), Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), and Ministry 
of Defense (MOD) are said to share duplicating roles with the MMEA, or share at least 
common interest with them, whether in territorial areas or functions. A thorough 
chronicle of the establishment of the MMEA is also incorporated in the chapter to 
understand the decision that led to the agency’s establishment. 
This chapter also discusses the evolution of the coast guard to highlight how 
important the maritime forces are becoming. To perform this role, the ability of the 
defense and maritime operations needs to be at a high level with the right framework. In 
this case, the USCG, CNZ, ICG, and JCG are used as examples from which the MMEA 
could benefit. With exception of the CNZ, this is to show how the coast guards’ roles 
may differ from other countries’ perspectives. The USCG, ICG, and JCG are among the 
biggest global maritime forces. Coast guard is getting more significant with greater 
reputation attached to the institution as not focused and limited in saving lives only. As 
for the CNZ, the distinction is shared to compare how different countries treat their 
maritime force. These coast guards’ roles, along with their history and an elaboration of 
their reporting structure from when it was first introduced are shared in the literature 
review to provide a better understanding of how a reporting structure has affected 
decision-making.  
By focusing on the changes related to coast guards’ reporting structures, this 
research could provide the MMEA with the best practices and examples needed to 
change its current chain of command. The structure may seems trivial as a success factor 
for an agency with a significant role in defense and security. But this structure is key to a 
smooth operation and future development. A more suitable reporting structure for a fully 
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matured agency such as the MMEA could help in managing its operational weaknesses, 
especially because the agency was established just 10 years ago. To promote their 
relevance and growth as one of law enforcement unit in Malaysia, a correct structure may 
encourage transparency within the divisions reporting to the same ministry. Furthermore, 
it streamlines the operations when the heads are of the same interests. Proper 
communication from the vertical aspects can be an impetus to how things work. This is 
the chain of command that ensures that the agency can coordinate support from other 
agencies within the same ministry.  
A. MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS  
1. Overview 
Malaysia practices parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy 
with the administration of His Majesty the Yang DiPertuan Agong as Head of State. One 
of the conditions of the parliamentary government in its exercise of democracy is that the 
power of governance is divided into three parts, namely the executive power, or 
government ministries and agencies; the judicial power; and the legislature. A cabinet is a 
committee that consists of all the ministers in Malaysia, with the Prime Minister acting as 
custodian. The cabinet is also an organization that runs the highest executive authority of 
the central (federal) government Federal on behalf of the Yang DiPertuan Agong.  
In Malaysia, the executive power is controlled by ministries. A ministry is the 
implementing agency for the highest government (executive), which is headed by a 
minister with a portfolio. Under each ministry are several departments that at times are 
also named as agencies. The role of each department is to carry out the functions as 
prescribed by the specific responsibilities of the ministry. A ministry in a government is 
headed by a minister who is appointed by the head of the executive, or the prime 
minister. There are also ministers who do not hold to lead a specific ministry but are 
instead responsible for carrying out certain duties based on their portfolios and are placed 
under the Prime Minister’s Department.  
There are 24 ministries in Malaysia, which are headed by ministers from the 
coalition ruling parties represented. These ministries are represented by various 
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multiethnic political parties, including 10 ministers in the Prime Minister’s Department, 
in addition to the prime minister and deputy prime minister (see Table 1).  
Table 1.   Ministries in the Federal Government 
MINISTRY 
 Prime Minister’s Department (PMD) 
Agriculture & Agro-Based Industry (MOA) 
Commodities  




Energy & Green Technology 




Home Affairs (MOHA) 
Housing & Local Authority 
Human Resource 
International Trade & Industries 
Natural Resources & Environment 
Public Works 
Rural Development  
Science, Technology, & Innovation 
Tourism 
Transport (MOT) 
Women, Family, & Community Affairs 
Youth & Sports 
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2. The Role of Ministries  
The ministries discussed in the paper are of those that are relevant to the 
administration and management of the MMEA. At present, the MMEA is under the 
Prime Minister’s Department, which has overseen the establishment of the MMEA ever 
since the Cabinet decided to have a dedicated agency for law enforcement and SAR at 
sea. In addition, there are also a few ministries—such as the MOT, MOD, and MOHA—
that could be related to the operation of the MMEA in relation to the core function of 
these ministries.  
a. Prime Minister’s Department 
The Prime Minister’s Department plays an important role similar to the White 
House in the U.S. government. In addition, it also plays a few other functions that are 
significant in relation to national unity among the distinct multi-ethnicity of Malaysia, 
and carries out national transformation programs that are opaque and not specifically 
performed by other ministries in the federal government. Other senior positions—such as 
deputy prime minister, chief secretary of the government, attorney general, and 
administratively all commissions, such as the Public Service Commission or the Election 
Commission, to name a few—are all placed under the Prime Minister’s Department.   
Additional functions of the Prime Minister’s Department are as follows: 
• To plan, formulate, and coordinate all of the federal government’s policies 
in consensus with Cabinet decisions, as the highest executive power. 
• To manage the National Planning Council, National Development 
Council, National Security Council, National Economic Action Council, 
and Council of National Service. 
There are five central agencies that are responsible for formulating national 
policies that are not under the jurisdiction of any ministries but that take effect across all 
levels in society. Central agencies provide guidelines and policies to be fully adhered to 
by all ministries, such as Human Resource Management and matters related to macro- 
and micro-economics. The central agencies are as follows:  
• Public Service Department 
• Implementation and Coordination Unit 
• Economic Planning Unit 
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• Malaysian Administrative, Modernization, and Management Planning 
Unit 
• Public-Private Partnership Unit  
In addition to the central agencies, a few other agencies under the Prime 
Minister’s Department are not suitable administratively to be recognized and placed 
under any specific ministry. However, these agencies are instead managed under the 
Prime Minister’s Department because of certain characteristics, such as the responsibility 
to enhance unity amongst races, to handle matters pertaining to Islamic or Parliamentary 
affairs, or to uphold the formulation of policies at the highest level within the federal 
government, under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister himself. Nevertheless, 
and interestingly, the MMEA and Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) are the 
only two operational agencies under the Prime Minister’s Department, as compared to 
other agencies that require active direct supervision of the prime minister due to their 
distinct characteristics, particularly in formulating national policies. The ESSCOM is 
purposely placed under the Prime Minister’s Department because of its multi-agencies 
nature comprised of Armed Forces, the police force, and the MMEA. The ESSCOM is a 
considered a task force established by the government in response to the intrusion of Sulu 
separatists in February 2013. The operation area of the ESSCOM is only in the vicinity of 
Eastern Sabah in a concerted effort to further enhance essentially security and public 
order. 
On the other hand, the MMEA is a totally new and permanent agency established 
by the government to operate in the Malaysian Maritime Domain throughout the country. 
The government decided to create the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Affairs Division 
(MMEAD), better known as Bahagian Hal Ehwal Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia 
(BHEPMM) in national language, to complement the MMEA in the exact role of a 
ministry to any other agency. Resource management and policy planning for the MMEA 
is coordinated and streamlined by the BHEPMM. However, the MMEA and BHEPMM 
do not exist in the same chain of command in the organizational structure of the Prime 
Minister’s Department.     
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There are many departments and other agencies under the Prime Minister’s 
Department. Amongst them, the MMEA and ESSCOMM are the operational agencies, 
and the MMEAD is an agency established specifically to function as a ministry for the 
MMEA in a supervisory role. The agencies under the Prime Minister’s Department are as 
follows: 
1. Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agencies (MMEA) 
2. Maritime Enforcement Affairs Division (MMEAD) 
3. Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) 
4. Parliament of Malaysia 
5. Human Rights Commission 
6. Anti-Corruption Commission 
7. Public Service Commission 
8. Education Service Commission 
9. Election Commission 
10. Attorney General’s Chambers 
11. Legal Affairs Division 
12. Legal Assistance Bureau 
13. Insolvency Unit 
14. Integrity Institute of Malaysia 
15. Ceremonial and International Conference Secretariat Division 
16. Cabinet, Constitution and Inter-Government Relations Division 
17. Property and Management Division 
18. Research Division 
19. Public Complaints Bureau 
20. National Civics Bureau 
21. Judicial and Legal Training Institute 
22. National Audit Department 
23. Department of Legal and Syariah 
24. Syariah Court of Federal Territory 
25. Department of Islamic Affairs Development 
26. Economic Action Council 
27. Department of Statistics 
28. Department of National Unity 
29. Malaysian Hajj Pilgrims Fund Board 
30. Department of Wakaf, Zakat, and Hajj Pilgrimage 
31. Legal Advisory Board 
32. Sabah Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board 
33. Sarawak Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board 
34. National Security Council 
35. Prime Minister’s Office 
36. Chief Government Security Officer 
37. Islamic Affairs Department of Federal Territory 
38. Federal Court Registrar’s Office 
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39. Science Advisory Office 
40. General Administration Office of Prime Minister’s Department 
41. Special Innovation Unit 
42. National Palace of Malaysia 
43. Office of the Keeper of the Rulers’ Seal 
44. Secretariat Office of Former Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir 
Mohammad 
45. Secretariat Office of Former Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Haji Ahmad 
Badawi 
46. Regulatory Office of Federal Land Development Authority 
47. Federal Land Development Authority 
48. Public Affairs Office of Federal Land Development Authority 
49. Penang Regional Development Authority 
50. Office of Federal Secretary, Sabah 
51. Office of Federal Secretary, Sarawak 
52. Early Education Secretariat 
53. Performance Management and Delivery Unit 
54. Witness Protection Division 
55. Federal Territories Director of Lands and Mines Office 
Each agency under the Prime Minister’s Department reports to a minister based 
on the specific portfolio given to each of the 10 ministers in the Prime Minister’s 
Department. However, due to the diverse nature of agencies under the Prime Minister’s 
Department, a minister could also handle and manage more than one agency. This 
eventually makes the Prime Minister’s Department a big ministry with various roles and 
complex organizational structure, as opposed to the normal structure of a ministry in the 
federal administration. Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of the Prime 





Figure 1.  Organizational Structure of the Prime Minister’s Department (from PMD 2010) 
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b. Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based Industry 
In 1955, the Ministry of Agriculture was established with three underlying 
portfolios of agriculture, forestry, and veterinary services. This ministry had changed its 
name and portfolio many times until after the formation of the Cabinet on March 27, 
2004, and recently adopted the name the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based 
Industry (MOA, 2015).  
The MOA’s objectives are to transform the agriculture sector into a modern, 
dynamic, and competitive sector; make Malaysia more competitive as the world’s leading 
producer of food and agriculture as one of the country’s economic growth engines; 
realize the vision of the ministry in making Malaysia a leader in agricultural 
transformation. Objectives include formulating and planning policies, strategies, and 
programs for agricultural development; evaluating and coordinating the implementation 
of the project or program of agricultural development; providing economic analysis, 
including collecting, analyzing, and restoring information or data on agriculture; 
designing and implementing publicity referral services and research; introducing an 
agricultural management information system; ensuring the participation of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Agro-based Industries in international programs; and acting as a one-
stop agency to private parties for advice and expertise in the agricultural sector. 
There are many agencies under the ministry, but one that collides with MMEA’s 
duties would be the Department of Fisheries (DOF), which is responsible for managing 
and developing the national fishery sector. Therefore, all services related to fishing 
activities, such as fishing licenses, marine catches, fish transport, fish export, and fish and 
fishing equipment import are under the supervision of the DOF. The DOF is also 
accountable for executing, monitoring, controlling, and surveillance tasks pursuant to that 
responsibility. The DOF is also a law enforcement agency tasked to oversee illegal 
poachers and other illegal fishing activities.  
c. Ministry of Transport 
According to the Malaysian Ministry of Transport’s website (2015), the history 
began in 1951 where, long before creation of the ministry, a committee was created to 
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handle matters pertaining to road transports and civil aviation, called as Members-in-
Charge of Land, Mineral, and Communication, while all matters related to rails, ports, 
and maritime were handled by the Members for Pails and Ports. In 1953, all matters 
related to rail, maritime affairs, civil aviation, and road transport were under one portfolio 
and administered by the minister in-charge for transportation. In 1956, the Ministry of 
Transport (MOT) was formed with numerous name changes until 1978, when the name 
was reverted to MOT with few additional responsibilities in relation to the transportation 
portfolio.  
There is an agency under the MOT that may share some interests in maritime 
activities with the MMEA, which is responsible of five main units: Ports, Maritime 
Security, Maritime Economy, Domestic Shipping Licensing Board (LPPDN), and the 
International Convention. Even though the unit is only in charge of security and activities 
at the ports, being under a different parent ministry may lead to problems in managing 
overall security aspects and dampen coordinated efforts to curb illegal activities. The 
MOT is the unit mainly responsible for promoting Malaysian entrepreneur participation 
in the shipping industry, both locally and abroad; and licensing, creating, and executing 
laws and policies pertaining to ports’ activities. It is also accountable for formulating 
policies on navigational safety, pollution prevention, ship security, and property and life 
at sea.  
d. Ministry of Home Affairs 
As with the history of other ministries, the subject of homeland security started 
under a committee system introduced by the British government in 1951. The Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MOHA) has been established since then under several names all serving 
the same purpose, which is to protect the internal national security. This ministry is in 
charge of maintaining security and stability in the country, preserving public order, 
supervising information flow, managing the records of Malaysia through the National 
Registration Department, and managing the records of non-residents via the Immigration 
Department. In carrying out the governance of national security and public order, the 
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MOHA focuses on three important aspects: prevention, enforcement, and rehabilitation. 
The agencies under the MOHA are as follows: 
• People’s Volunteer Corps  
• Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) 
• Civil Defence Department (CDD) 
• National Printing  
• National Anti-Drug Agency  
• Police Force Commission  
• National Registration Department 
• Film Censorship Board 
• Immigration Department (MOHA, 2015) 
The MOHA is responsible for maintaining peace in Malaysia and curbing threats 
that could cause harm to Malaysia and its people. On the subject of crime prevention and 
law enforcement, the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) has been entrusted to carry out this 
task. One of the branches under the RMP is the Marine Operations Force (MOF), which 
performs the constabulary role in the maritime domain. It is this role with which the 
MMEA is said to share many duplicate functions, which the government has to address 
and rectify. In terms of insightfulness of operation and networking, the MOF clearly has 
the edge due to its maturity. The MOF has been around since as early as 1947. Because 
crimes often begin at sea and end on shore, the MOF is a part of the RMP, and therefore, 
information is readily and easily accessible through cooperation from within the 
organization. In order to facilitate and manage cross-border criminal activities, the MOF 
has access to criminal intelligence provided through the RMP, the interface agency to 
Interpol, and the e-ADS and Interpol Database (ASEANAPOL). The MOF clearly has 
leverage on this linkage, which may not be readily available to agencies other than the 
police themselves. The MOF has also established bilateral relations with the littoral states 
coast guards and regional police force that can facilitate the assignment of combating 
cross-border crime.  
Due overlapping jurisdiction between the MMEA and MOF, the Cabinet decided 
that tasks and responsibilities of the MOF only cover rivers, lakes, and islands, thus 
making national security, public order, and crime prevention a core assignment of the 
MOF. As stated in RMP’s website (Official Portal of Royal Malaysian Police, 2014), 
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after taking into account the decision of the Cabinet, the police enforcement scope of 
work in the water is as follows: 
1. all the rivers, including estuaries; 
2. all lakes, dams, and watersheds; 
3. all islands in the waters of the state; 
4. all coastal plain and riverside country until 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) from 
the beach and the riverside to the mainland; and 
5. all harbors, piers, and docks across the country. 
e. Ministry of Defence 
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) was established in 1957. Since then, it has been 
responsible for managing national defence, national security from outside threat by 
implementing national defence policies, decision-making, and government policies. It 
also manages the resources allocated by the government, including the purchase of assets 
of national defence, and is the administrative center (command center) for the Malaysia 
Armed Forces. 
There are several agencies under the MOD: 
• Royal Malaysian Army  
• Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) 
• Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) 
• Veteran Affairs Department  
• National Service Department  
• Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence  
Because the MOD is directly involved in maintaining peace and security of 
Malaysia’s borders from outside threats, ensuring the border’s peace and security would 
become a joint collaboration with the MMEA. The MMEA Act of 2004 (Act 633), 
Section 17,1 specifically mentions that the MMEA can be mobilized and placed under the 
command of the Armed Forces in the event of war. 
The RMN and RMAF both play important roles in defending national interests, 
sovereignty, and integrity, not forgetting the safety of the people and properties by aiding 
other maritime enforcement agencies. However, both the RMN and RMAF are less 
                                                 
1 Notwithstanding any provisions of this act or any other federal law, the agency, or any part of the 
agency as may be determined by the minister, shall be under the general command and control of the 
Armed Forces of Malaysia during any period of emergency, special crisis, or war. 
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skilled in managing domestic law because this is not their main task, and their assets are 
not suited to most of maritime felonies.  
B. MALAYSIA MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
1. Background 
When 200 nautical miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was declared in 
1980, Malaysia gained twice the area of territorial seas than what it had in land. A study 
was conducted on the directive of the Malaysian Cabinet to measure the effectiveness of 
enforcement duties performed by the existing agencies to protect Malaysian sovereignty 
from threats through the territorial waters and their boundaries. A major concern of this 
study was law and order and coordination during SAR missions in the Malaysian 
Maritime Zone. This study was carried out by the National Security Council of the Prime 
Minister’s Department and became the foundation for the establishment of the Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), or in Malay, Agensi Penguatkuasaan Maritim 
Malaysia (APMM). The headquarters of the agency is located in the vicinity of Putrajaya, 
the federal administrative capital of Malaysia.  
Prior to the establishment of the MMEA, there were 12 departments and agencies 
responsible for managing and patrolling the Malaysian Maritime Zone. The various 
agencies were as follows: 
• Marine Operation Force of the Royal Malaysia Police  
• Department of Immigration 
• Royal Malaysian Navy 
• Royal Malaysian Air Force 
• Marine Department of Peninsular Malaysia 
• Marine Department of Sabah and Sarawak 
• Department of Fisheries (DOF) 
• Royal Malaysian Customs Department 
• Department of Environment 
• Department of Lands and Mines 
• Mineral and Geoscience Department 
• Maritime Enforcement Coordination Centre 
The multiple agencies have resulted in duplicities and also redundancies in roles, 
overlapping of territorial areas, unhealthy competition in assets procurement, and the 
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under-utilization of assets and human resources. Among other weaknesses was the 
existence of many agencies, each lacking the right amount of assets and manpower to 
carry out the expected duties. Bringing all of these roles and assets together under the 
MMEA would yield a better result. On November 10, 2005, during the launching of the 
MMEA, then-Deputy Prime Minister Razak said, “With the forming of MMEA as a 
single agency, the country’s resources can be optimized and save money because the 
focus is given to a single agency in enforcement of maritime security” (Ishak, Anuar & 
Ramli, 2005). Those weaknesses of duplication and redundancy could be reduced with 
the establishment of the MMEA. The immediate task for the MMEA to embark on is the 
handling of cases, such as encroachment of foreign fishing vessels, human trafficking, 
piracy at sea, the intrusion of foreign ships, marine pollution, smuggling activities, and 
other threats that may affect the sovereignty of the Malaysian territorial waters. This can 
affect and threaten the nation’s interests in the fisheries sector and tourism, and ultimately 
jeopardize defense and security. 
2. History 
A Nucleus Team for the MMEA’s establishment was initiated in 2002 with the 
objective of managing the legal and bureaucratic requirement of the agency. The agency 
was formally established from the legal perspective with the enactment of the Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency Act of 2004 (Act 633)2 by the Malaysian Parliament in 
May 2004. Subsequently, the act received the Royal Assent from the Yang Di Pertuan 
Agong on June 25, 2004, and was gazetted on July 1 of the same year. February 15, 2005, 
was the act’s official date of establishment. The agency achieved operational status on 
November 30, 2005, with the commencement of patrols by MMEA vessels. The Nucleus 
Team, with its 20 officers, was then dissolved and made into the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Affairs Division (MMEAD), or in Malay, Bahagian Hal Ehwal 
Penguatkuasaan Maritim Malaysia (BHEPMM), to continue assisting the MMEA with 
policies on operational aspects, procurement, workforce development, and strategic 
                                                 
2 This act to established the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, enabling the agency to perform 
enforcement functions for ensuring the safety and security of the Malaysian Maritime Zone with a view to 
the protection of maritime and other national interests in the zone and for matters necessary thereto or 
connected therewith (Attorney General’s Chamber, 2006). 
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planning. The MMEAD began its operations on March 1, 2006, with the dissolution of 
the Nucleus Team.  
In its initial stages, the MMEAD was known as the Supervisory Office of the 
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (billet Warrant No. A126 Year 2005), which 
took effect on December 1, 2005, with 42 posts. However, “On June 28, 2006, the name 
of the Supervisory Office of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency was later 
changed to Maritime Enforcement Affairs Division, or MMEAD, (billet Warrant No. 
A68 Year 2006), effective June 1, 2006” (Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Affairs 
Division, 2011). 
The MMEA currently has its own special forces unit known as the Special Task 
and Rescue (STAR) Team modelled after the U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime Safety and 
Security Team (MSST). It is composed of members from the Royal Malaysian Air Force 
and Royal Malaysian Navy’s special force. Their task is to act on hostage rescue works in 
shallow waters that falls under the MMEA’s jurisdiction. They are also tasked to do anti-
terrorist actions in Malaysian waters, alongside the Royal Malaysian Navy.  
3. Reasons for Establishment 
The sad events of September 11, 2001, that brought down World Trade Center in 
New York City, which caused thousands of casualties, and billions of dollars in losses, 
highlighted that acts of terrorism via any mode of transportation could be exploited as 
weapons by non-state actors. Cargoes, too, could be converted into powerful weapons. 
Thus, there is evidence that some pressure was exerted by the United States, fearing that 
militants could have targeted their interest-linked ships, on the littoral states of the Strait 
of Malacca to beef up the security of one of the world’s busiest navigation routes for 
commercial shipping. The MMEA will perform not only as a unit to handle non-military 
threats, but also as an agency with serious tasks in order to combat terrorism by illegal 
immigration and smuggling of items, such as weapons, narcotics, arms, and ammunition, 
to name a few. 
The waterway and seas have become important transportation hubs and source of 
economy for Malaysia. The sandy coastline, the crystal clear water, and the various 
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species of marine life and plants are popular among tourists. The coastline provides 
employment opportunities, particularly for people living on the seafront. Fish from the 
many fishing villages along the coastal settlement in Malaysia  has been one of the main 
sources of protein for the country. The coastal areas sheltered from the wind makes for 
the most suitable locations to set up the port. The main ports are Port Klang in Selangor, 
Pasir Gudang Port and Tanjung Pelepas in Johor, and Kuantan Port in Pahang. Ports have 
helped develop commercial activities and spurred aggressive industrialization, which 
contribute massively in exports and imports. Malaysia’s sea is rich in minerals, such as 
petroleum and natural gas, especially in the South China Sea in the state of Terengganu 
and Sarawak, which influences the seafront area developed by mining activities. Many 
other economies have subsequently grown out of ports. There are also petrochemical 
industrial activities in new towns, such as Kerteh in Terengganu, and Miri and Bintulu in 
Sarawak. This signifies the importance of protecting Malaysian maritime borders from 
the non-military threats, thefts, illegal activities, misuse of hubs, and other non-state 
actors. Section 2 of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004, or Act 633, 
describes the Malaysian Maritime Zone as the internal waters, territorial sea, continental 
shelf, exclusive economic zone, and Malaysian fisheries waters, as well as the air space 
over the zone (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Malaysian Maritime Zone (from MMEA, 2011b) 
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The Malaysia Maritime Zone (MMZ), which includes the EEZ, covers 556,285 
square kilometers (National Hydrographic Center, 2011). The 4,490 km coastline is very 
extensive and would require a very high commitment to address the challenges, mainly in 
the EEZ Strait of Malacca, in the EEZ South China Sea along the East Coast Peninsula, 
in Sabah and Sarawak, and in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea along the east coast of 
Sabah.  
4. Reporting Structure 
As the result of study conducted into making the MMZ and stakeholders a 
secured and a safer place, three options were considered (Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Affairs Division, 2011). 
Option 1: Maintain and upgrade the existing agencies and resources. 
Option 2: Create an integrated enforcement agency composed of all 
agencies related to maritime enforcement. 
Option 3: Create a new and dedicated enforcement agency for maritime 
purposes. 
Option 2 was recommended by the research team of this study, hence the initiation of the 
MMEA in 2005. This option sees the integration of all related units, with the aim to 
enhance and strengthen supervision, maritime safety, sovereignty, optimization of assets, 
utilization of resources, reduction of wastage, while creating a new work culture that is 
more flexible, adaptable, and focused on maritime stakeholders. This option sees 
systematic maritime management and is able to move in parallel with developed 
countries in managing, administrating, and preserving maritime resources. 
One of the concerns is who will be the owner of the agency. Because the MMEA 
is at present placed under the wing of the Prime Minister’s Department as its ministry, the 
creation of the MMEAD was required as the organization that carries out the ministerial 
functions for the MMEA after the MMEA was officially launched and operational in 
2005. The decision to place the MMEA under the Prime Minister’s Department was 
approved by the Malaysian Cabinet to ensure the smooth transition of resources and 
manpower, unwavering success of the MMEA’s legal framework for establishment, and 
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the right paradigm shift in facing all bureaucratic challenges. With direct command and 
clear subordination from the deputy prime minister himself as the minister-in-charge, the 
process of formalizing the agency will be made easier and faster if the establishment were 
to be carried out under a different organization or ministry. The government saw the need 
to place the MMEA under the Prime Minister’s Department as a solution to avoiding 
potential struggle and shortcomings caused by other agencies that may have had interests 
in the jurisdiction and operation of a newly created agency such as the MMEA. The RMP 
could have thought that they were supposed to be given the responsibility to spearhead 
the agency as the federal agency for law enforcement and the relevance of their MOF, 
which was then known as the Marine Police. This was obvious and especially true 
because the MOF has been undertaking the roles of maintaining maritime security and 
curbing criminal activities as its core function. In addition, any law enforcement 
agencies, such as the Immigration Department and Royal Customs, may legitimately 
make assertive arguments to spearhead the newly created MMEA as well. 
Since becoming fully operational in 2005 and continuingly becoming a credible 
force in the MMZ, the MMEA is still under the Prime Minister’s Department, as this 
paper exhibits. Where should it rightfully belong? As discussed previously, the Prime 
Minister’s Department is seen as a policy-making ministry rather than an operational 
entity. There is no other law enforcer or armed forces unit that serves as part of their 
agencies. 
C. EMERGENCE OF THE COAST GUARD 
It is undeniable that the issue of maritime security does not involve only the 
military, but also a variety of civilian agencies. The involvement of civil institutions in 
not because of any inability within the Navy, but certain aspects of maritime security and 
safety are technically not within the Navy’s jurisdiction. It is not uncommon in many 
countries to have coast guard organizations, under various names but performing similar 
functions, that serve in the field of security and safety of navigation. Coast guards have 
been around from the early 1700s, though perhaps with different functions.  
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After the September 11 attacks, more countries became aware that such threats 
are imminent that could possibly originate from a waterway, partly because there were 
two maritime terrorism attacks after that date: the attack on the USS Cole in the Yemeni 
port on October 12, 2000; and the attack on the MV Limburg in the waters of Yemen on 
October 6, 2002. In the latter case, according to Capt. Dirk Vernaeve (2007) in his book 
Maritime Security in Ports, on October 6, 2002, Limburg was carrying 397,000 barrels of 
crude oil from Iran to Malaysia, and was in the Gulf of Aden off Yemen to pick up 
another load of oil. It was registered under a French-flag and had been chartered by the 
Malaysian state-owned oil-and-gas company, Petronas. While it was some miles 
offshore, an explosives-laden dinghy rammed the starboard side of the tanker and 
detonated. The vessel caught fire, and approximately 90,000 barrels of oil leaked into the 
Gulf of Aden. One casualty was reported, and many were injured. 
The many occurrences of potential threats from terrorism to piracy forced 
international parties, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO),3 stressed 
the importance of the role of civil authorities in maintaining maritime security. This is in 
line with the rules in the field of maritime security and safety, such as The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)4 in 1982, the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code,5 the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention, the SUA Protocol, the SAR 
Convention, and others, leading to a civil institution that is widely known as the Coast 
Guard. 
                                                 
3 The purposes of the organization, as summarized by Article 1(a) of the Convention, are “to provide 
machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and practices 
relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and 
facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, 
efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships” (IMO, 2015). 
4 The UNCLOS, also called the Law of the Sea Convention or the Law of the Sea treaty, is the 
international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. 
5 The ISPS Code provides a standardized, consistent framework for managing risk and permitting the 
meaningful exchange and evaluation of information between contracting governments, companies, port 
facilities, and ships. 
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Although not all countries call civilian institutions that deal with maritime 
security the coast guard, it is clear that there is a difference in function between the coast 
guard and other institutions, such as the Marine Police Force, Customs Department, and 
so forth. At times, it is difficult to differentiate between the roles of lawships and 
warships. The USCG, for example, carries both roles, depending on the situation. The 
emergence of coast guards around the world has been picking up rapidly since 1998. In 
the Asia Pacific, several countries have had coast guard: India, with the Indian Coast 
Guard; China, with the China Coast Guard, and Japan, with the Japanese Coast Guard. 
Japan changed the name from Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) to the Japanese 
Coast Guard (JCG) in 2000, acknowledging is function as coast guard. As for the other 
countries who have not had the organization, or at least the functions, of a coast guard 
historically, those functions are spread across a number of different agencies. 
With regards to Southeast Asia, the development of Coast Guard is mushrooming, 
too. The MMEA, formed in 2005, was created to relieve its currently overburdened navy 
and maritime police. Indonesia recently launched Badan Keamanan Laut Republik 
Indonesia (Bakamla) in 2014. It was reported that Bakamla has long existed with a 
different name to serve as a maritime coordinating agency since 2005, after being 
dormant since 1972, but the duplications of roles and other issues have dampened its 
progress and effectiveness (Jatmiko & Tandiarrang, 2014). Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines all have their own dedicated units to protect their maritime 
borders. There was also numerous bilateral cooperation between all these coast guards, 
sometimes with Japanese and Indian Coast Guard, when conducting training or exercises 
that promised future endeavors to combat problems that may arise. The blossoming 
nascent networking promise a greater maritime security. 
D. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
The United States has proclaimed to have the best Coast Guard in the world, upon 
which every other coast guard organization desires to model its own organizational 
structure. The USCG is one of the oldest branches of the American military and is unique 
in a number of ways, with its primary purpose to ensure the safety of the United States’ 
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shores and waterways. It has five core focusses: national and maritime security, 
preserving national resources, maritime safety, maritime mobility, and national defense 
(National Academies Press, 2007, p. 47). It is unique in such a way that the organization 
has the authority to enforce laws in the territorial sea as well as the high sea. Unlike other 
services and federal agencies around the world, the USCG is simultaneously an armed 
force of the United States and a federal law enforcement agency. 
1. Introduction 
The United States has 5,525 miles of border with Canada, 1,989 miles of border 
with Mexico, 95,000 miles of shoreline, and a 3.4 million square-mile EEZ 
(Bullock, Haddow, & Coppola, 2012, p. 205), requiring that an armed customs 
enforcement service protect its land from illegal maritime activities and also from 
national security threats. Being one of the five armed forces, the USCG’s main focus is 
saving lives while others engage in combat in war and protect the nation from outside 
threats. 
First introduced in 1790 by Alexander Hamilton (USCG, n.d.), the unit is still one 
of the oldest services to operate in the sea that enforces tariffs and trade laws, and also to 
curb smuggling activities. The “Revenue Cutter,” as it was named when first introduced, 
was the only unit at sea that collected taxes, hence the name. As time goes on, this 
organization is becoming a more important forefront in order to ensure the safety of 
maritime stakeholders: the maritime inhabitants, the fishermen, the businesses, the 
transporters, and commercial vehicles, to name a few. This unit has roles in protecting 
maritime homeland security; in fact, it also acts as law enforcement to guard maritime 
stakeholders, cater SAR operations, protect the marine environment, and maintain and 
provide aids to navigation.  
The USCG protects the stakeholders from natural disasters, combats against 
illegal activities such as drug and human trafficking, and corresponds with other units to 
help prevent the growing national security threats. It is to no surprise, then, that even 
though their main responsibilities are protecting American’s own waters, they were still 
needed for overseas missions, whether for military or humanitarian purposes. In the latter 
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case, the USCG was ordered to deliver U.S. aid to the Republic of Georgia after the 
South Ossetia war in 2008 (Bahrampour & Pan, 2008).  
Since its inception, the USCG has always been embroiled in many important 
wars, from quasi-war with France (1797–1801), to World War I, World War II, the 
Vietnam War, and beyond. It has also provided aid, like with Operation Desert Storm. 
This shows the flexibility in the USCG’s reporting structure, because it was mandated 
that when it is required for the USCG to perform military activities, the unit will report to 
the Secretary of Defense. 
2. Brief History 
Having been around the world since 1789, the service, which eventually became 
known as the U.S. Lighthouse Service, was established under the control of the Treasury 
Department. The next year, the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, created a 
maritime service to enforce customs laws, which were passed in 1790. Alternately known 
as the system of cutters, the Revenue Service, and the Revenue-Marine, this service was 
placed under the control of the Treasury Department because it was initially formed to 
enforce and collect tariffs and taxes from related parties. In late 1870s, the Steamboat 
Inspection Service and U.S. Life-Saving Service became parts of the Treasury 
Department.  
The actual United States Coast Guard was developed on January 28, 1915, when 
President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the Act to Create the Coast Guard, an act 
passed by Congress on January, 20, 1915, and which combined the Life-Saving Service 
and Revenue Cutter Service to form the Coast Guard. First introduced as law enforcers, 
in 1917, with the declaration of war against Germany, the Coast Guard was transferred by 
Executive Order to the control of the Navy Department. Since then, the roles of USCG 
may be expanded into military purposes with the approval of the president of the United 
States. This again took place in 1941 under President Roosevelt, who transferred the 
Coast Guard to Navy Department control. 
However, with the introduction of the Department of Transportation in 1967, the 
Coast Guard was transferred from the Treasury Department to the newly formed 
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Department of Transportation. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, President George W. Bush proposed the creation of a new Cabinet-level agency, 
eventually named the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard was foremost 
among the agencies slated to become a constituent of the new department. Formally, on  
March 1, 2003, the Coast Guard was transferred from the Department of Transportation 
to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. 
3. Reporting Structure 
There are seven uniformed services in United States of America: 
• United States Army  
• United States Marine Corps  
• United States Navy  
• United States Air Force  
• United States Coast Guard 
• United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps 
• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Officer 
Corps 
Among these services, the first five units are the combatant or armed forces, with 
the USCG being the only component reporting to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS); the other armed forces report to the Secretary of Defense. The USCG, as 
established by Title 14 of the U.S. Code,6 (Cornell University Law School (n.d.)) is a 
branch of the U.S. armed forces. It is probably the smallest task force when compared to 
the other armed forces, but it is the seventh largest navy in the world.  
When the USCG first introduced, it was placed under the Treasury Department, 
perhaps because it was sanctioned to seize illegal economic activities and protect 
maritime stakeholders’ interest. The USCG was the law enforcement agency that 
collected tariffs and taxes at sea. Even though the USCG reported to the secretary of 
treasury, there were times where the unit was placed under the Department of Defense 
(DOD) (within the Department of the Navy) during wartime, and current federal laws 
authorize this to be done at the authorization of Congress or the president. The USCG 
                                                 
6 “The Coast Guard, as established January 28, 1915, shall be a military service and a branch of the 
armed forces of the United States at all times.” 
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was initially a part of the U.S Department of Treasury prior to its establishment and until 
1967.  
What took place in 1967 changed the structure of the USCG? The establishment 
of the Department of Transportation (DOT) by an act of Congress, signed into law by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson on October 15, 1966. Its first secretary, Alan S. Boyd, took 
office on January 16, 1967. The DOT’s first official day of operation was April 1, 1967 
(Kane, 2003, para 1).  
In 1992, a formal working group was chartered by the Board to define 
Coast Guard national defense roles, missions, and functions. This group 
recommended that maritime interception operations, deployed/foreign port 
control, and environmental defense operations be added to the above 
Coast Guard’s national security functions. An October 3, 1995, 
Memorandum of Agreement signed by representatives of DOD and DOT 
formalized the working group’s recommendation. (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 1998) 
The Department of Transportation Act (80 Stat. 931), passed October 15, 1966, 
consolidated highway, rail, air, and marine transportation functions previously vested in 
the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and the Interior, as well as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Aviation Agency, and Saint 
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. The mission of the DOT, a Cabinet-level 
executive department of the United States government, is to develop and coordinate 
policies that will provide an efficient and economical national transportation system, with 
due regard for need, environment, and national defense. It is the primary agency in the 
federal government with the responsibility to shape and administer policies and programs 
that protect and enhance the safety, adequacy, and efficiency of the transportation system 
and services. 
In 2003, the USCG ended a 36-year term of being under the DOT and was handed 
over to the DHS. This establishment was a national security wake-up call by the 
President of United States at that time, George W. Bush, in the wake of September 11 
attacks by terrorists. As a result of the attacks, homeland security has moved to the 
forefront of the service’s primary missions. Since the attacks executed by terrorists from 
within the United States, stricter control has been required regarding the people who 
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come in and go out of the United States, and knowing the whereabouts of people who are 
potential threats has become a priority.  
Even though the USCG operates under the DHS during times of peace, it can be 
transferred to operating under the Department of the Navy during times of war in 
accordance with Title 14 U.S.C. 1–37 (Cornell University Law School (n.d.). The transfer 
and the horizontal aspect of relationship among other units in DHS ensures that all 
aspects of border control, including the issuing of visas, are informed by a central 
information-sharing clearinghouse and compatible databases.  
 
Figure 3.  Department of Homeland Security Organization Chart (from Official 
website of the Department of Homeland Security, 2013) 
                                                 
7 “The Coast Guard, which is a military service and a branch of the armed forces, is to operate as a 
service within the Navy upon declaration of war or when the President directs, until the President by 
executive order transfers it back to its peacetime parent department.” 
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E. INDIAN COAST GUARD 
1. Brief History 
The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) has been around since the late 1970s. There was an 
urgent need to expand the enforcement, which was inadequate and had not kept pace with 
the substantial increase in the maritime activities in the seas around India. Establishment 
of the ICG started with discussions in September 1974 among the Indian Navy, the Air 
Force, and the Department of Revenue, regarding ways to combat smuggling activities. 
The Rustamji Committee recommended the establishment of the ICG under the Ministry 
of Defence on July 31, 1975. The cabinet secretary made a recommendation to place the 
service under the Ministry of Home Affairs; however, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi overruled the cabinet secretary and decided to accept the original 
recommendation of the Rustamji Committee to place the service under the Ministry of 
Defence. Next, an interim coast guard was formed as part of the Navy in 1977 to assume 
the tasks. The duties and functions of the service were formally defined in the Coast 
Guard Act, which was passed by India’s parliament on August 18, 1978, and came into 
immediate effect.  
 
Figure 4.  Exclusive Economic Zone of India (from Indian Navy, 2007) 
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2. Reporting Structure 
The ICG is similar to the USCG in terms of the organizational set up. The only 
difference is that the ICG has always been under the MOD. It is budgeted under the 
Department of Revenue in the Finance Ministry, although it is administratively under the 
MOD. The role of the ICG was constituted as a force only to deter the economic 
offenders engaged in smuggling activities. The roles kept increasing, with added 
responsibilities including national security, economy or/and energy security, law 
enforcement, protection of maritime inhabitants, environmental security, and wartime 
role. Both the ICG and the Navy operate in the Territorial Sea. The ICG handles issues in 
international waters and the EEZ in tackling issues such as smuggling, illegal 
immigration, and poaching. The ICG should handle municipal matters because there are 
many untidy functions in maritime enforcement. Having both organizations under same 
ministry helps smooth the coordination of efforts and planning of resources management. 
This also help the ICG grow and develop under the direction of the MOT. However, in 
times of crisis, the ICG should be equipped the way the Navy wants it to be. 
Other than sharing land boundaries, mostly in the northern and eastern region of 
the country, India also has a long coastline. According to Rocha (2013), the 7,517 
kilometers of Indian coastline shares boundaries with seven neighbors, namely, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia. Besides the 
continental territory, there are more than 300 inhabited island possessions, including the 
Lakshadween, and Andaman, and Nicobar Islands. The seven neighboring states are 
plagued with economic problems, such as poverty and political and social instability. 
Instabilities such as extremism, terrorism, and military instability, particularly to the 
West, in countries such as Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, 
and Sri Lanka, among others, threaten peace and stability. The long coastline, 
compounded with the large area of maritime territory and the EEZ, are why the ICG 
should be placed with the Navy under the Ministry of Defence.  
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Figure 5.  Maritime Boundaries of India (from Rocha, 2013) 
F. THE ROYAL NEW ZEALAND COASTGUARD INCORPORATED 
1. Overview  
The coast guard in New Zealand has been around since late 19th century. Due to 
New Zealand’s rugged coastline, local boaters were aware that they needed to rescue 
people from maritime tragedy, and to prevent such tragedies from occurring at all. Thus, 
a group effort of volunteers set up a unit to focus on saving lives. It has neither political 
nor economic interests. 
The Royal New Zealand Coastguard Incorporated is the “go to” coast guard for 
marine safety, education, and SAR services. The mission of this agency is solely to save 
lives at sea without doing any law enforcement, as is commonly done by other coast 
guards (CNZ, 2015). The CNZ does not interfere in maritime security or economic 
security but instead focuses entirely on saving lives. Sea rescue services have existed in 
New Zealand since at least 1861, but it was not until 1976 that various local groups 
 33 
formed the national New Zealand Coastguard Federation. In 1991, the word federation 
was dropped, and the national body officially became known as Royal New Zealand 
Coastguard Inc., commonly called the Coastguard. Their units are placed along New 
Zealand’s coastline and major lakes and rivers. 
The unique element about the Coastguard is that it runs as a charity, makes no 
profit, and is administered by highly trained professional volunteers who dedicate their 
time to saving lives. Nevertheless, even a charity body needs funding to operate; 
therefore, the Coastguard has a service-level agreement with the government, which 
provides it with about 15% of its annual funding. The cost to keep the Coastguard 
network running is around NZ $8.5 million annually, and the remaining 85% needs to be 
raised from supportive organizations and individuals (Auckland Now, 2008). The 
Coastguard also relies on annual membership fees to sustain the organization. The 
Coastguard is not a security or military organization, and unlike other coast guards, it is 
not part of the government, nor is it a law enforcement agency. However, rising costs to 
maintain and conduct operations resulted in charges made to non-members for services 
rendered, beginning in 2006. The stipulated charge per hour based on the article to cover 
the fuel and other related costs began at NZ $200 and up, depending on the type of 
mission and platform mobilized for the search operation.   
2. Other Related Agencies 
In addition to the Royal New Zealand Coastguard Incorporated, there are other 
agencies operating in the New Zealand maritime domain.  
• The New Zealand Police coordinate smaller SAR incidents in New 
Zealand, with assistance and resources from the Coastguard as required. 
• The Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ) is the body 
accountable for major maritime disasters.  
• Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) is a government body that ensures the 
safety of mariners by managing lighthouses and providing aid and 
navigation to vessels, elements that are related to economic security. The 
maintenance of safety at sea has remained an important part of this 
organization (MNZ, n.d.).  
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G. JAPANESE COAST GUARD 
1. Overview 
Japan, despite ranking only 61st in the world in terms of land area (380,000 km2), 
has a combined sea area of territorial waters and EEZ of 12 times larger (4,470,000 km2) 
than its land area (Global Security Organization, 2014). Though known as the Japanese 
Maritime Safety Agency (JMSA) in May 1, 1948, its English name was changed to the 
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in April 2000. The roles of the JCG basically cover what other 
coast guards do: maintaining peace and security, guaranteeing maritime safety, 
conducting search and rescue, preventing and fighting maritime disasters, protecting 
maritime environment, and collaborating with domestic and foreign organizations. 
Japan is one of the countries that heavily depends on the safe passage of ships, 
especially via the Straits of Malacca, hence the great collaboration and cooperation 
among the Straits’ littoral states. Even prior to the launch of the MMEA, several visits to 
the JCG and the ports showed the same interest of providing a safe avenue for vessels 
from maritime threats, especially piracy. The JCG vessels have patrolled the South China 
Sea and carried out joint exercises with civilian maritime counterparts in Southeast Asia. 
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Figure 6.  Exclusive Economic Zone of Japan (from JCG, 2014) 
2. Reporting Structure 
The JCG as a uniformed services was established under the Ministry of Transport 
(MOT). The Port State Control, unlike the USCG, is within the purview of the Maritime 
Technology and Safety Bureau, which is also under the MOT. As stated in the legislation 
Maritime Safety Agency Law, Article 25, neither the JCG nor its personnel can be trained 
or function as military establishment. It is also stipulated that the equipment should meet 
not military standards but the requirements of the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The budget for the JCG is obtained from Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) through the MOT. 
It is important that the unit be separated from the military and work as the police 
because the JCG does not need powerful weapons to carry out its functions. The JCG 
should function just as a law enforcement agency and be independent from politics. It is 
not clear whether it will have to participate should there be a war. Under the MOT, there 
is no direct relationship between the JCG and the Navy, known as Japan Maritime Self-
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Defense Force (JMSDF). However, there was one joint exercise with the JMSDF against 
North Korean ships and the proposition for heavily arming of JCG vessels. There was an 
incident reported that there will be a move towards militarization of the JCG by heavily 
arming its vessels, said as a move to “improve patrols around some disputed islands in 
the East China Sea, Kyodo News reported in early March. The discussion has been in the 
works since November 2012, and, having cleared the Japanese Ministry of Defence, the 
ball now lies in the JCG’s court” (Simpson, 2013). Because of the Sensaku Islands’ 
wrangle, the government is considering transferring decommissioned MSDF destroyers 
to the JCG to patrol the areas. For now, the JCG is still under MOT, which has been 
renamed the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. 
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III. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
A. DIFFERENT ROLES OF COAST GUARDS WITHIN GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURES  
In the previous chapter, we identified how each country perceives its respective 
coast guards, and the distinct role of each organization as reflected in its reporting 
structure. The roles differ quite significantly, from lifesaving, to surveillance, to a more 
serious role as defending the sovereignty of the nation from external threats. From within 
the government structure, coast guards are under the federal government as opposed to 
smaller law enforcement agencies, such as the police departments in the United States, or 
as merely law enforcement in smaller counties, districts, or municipalities. For this 
reason, the function of law enforcement is not generally the key determinant in placin an 
agency such as the coast guard under the federal or state structure because enforcing laws 
can be undertaken when the agency is allowed to be an enforceable entity. Nevertheless, 
in the maritime domain, state agencies cannot enforce specific categories of law, such as 
laws provided under the IMO. It is actually under the IMO that a country that ratifies the 
SOLAS has the obligation to undertake the role of SAR at sea, not only in territorial 
waters or the EEZ, but also far beyond international waters. This role requires specific 
technical skills, equipment, and certain training modules required for coast guards.  
There are few countries that have agencies performing coast guard activities, such 
as the JCG, which the Japanese government considers an agency under the Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. The JCG’s vessels are not equipped with 
heavy artilleries like those of the warships, but merely light weapons for crime prevention 
and law enforcement at sea. The JCG, together with the USCG, is the agency on which 
the MMEA was modelled during its inception.   
The CNZ, on the other hand, is committed only to its lifesaving function, and the 
agency itself is not even considered a government agency in New Zealand because the 
CNZ is not required to enforce law. Therefore, the reporting structure of the CNZ does 
not link directly to the government system because its only focus is to assist the maritime 
community and those at peril in the maritime zone. 
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There are an indefinite number of countries that are recognized to have coast 
guards. As extracted from the Central Intelligence Agency (n.d.) website, Table 2 shares 
some countries in which naval forces operate under both pretenses. Some coast guards, 
such as the ICG, are branches of countries’ military forces. There is no specific reason as 
to why coast guards of those countries are joined with naval forces because coast guards 
are supposed to perform as the constabulary role within territorial waters, and not as a 
defense force.  
However, there are also certain agencies that specifically give focus to just 
maritime matters. Goldstein (2010), in his Chinese maritime study, explained that the 
China Maritime Police is a part of the Border Control Department (BCD). The BCD is an 
elite subcomponent of the People’s Armed Police, which is likely derived from the Soviet 
model, which is also designated for guarding borders as a separate and elite formation. 
The primary mission of the Maritime Police is to fight and investigate crime, but 
emergent threats have taken on special concerns, which also include terrorism and piracy. 
The China Maritime Police operate speedboats and small cutters. It is worth emphasizing 
that this force is armed with machine guns and small cannons. However, there is 
competition to BCD: the existence of the Maritime Safety Administration of the Chinese 
Ministry of Transportation, which has the same duties and responsibilities. 
With regards to the United States, which the MMEA also used as the model 
agency during its inception, the USCG’s roles have been evolving from tax collector to a 
more serious roles in ensuring maritime security and managing threats in the maritime 
domain. The USCG was first established under the Treasury Department to protect the 
nation’s revenue, to safeguard against illegal activities that may affect its economy, and 
to act as tax collectors. As part of the DHS, the White House (2005), during President 
George W. Bush’s administration, explicitly took maritime affairs and maritime security 
to the maximum:  
Various departments have each carried out maritime security strategies 
which have provided an effective layer of security since 2001. In 
December 2004, the President directed the Secretaries of the Department 
of Defense and Homeland Security to lead the Federal effort to develop a 
comprehensive National Strategy for Maritime Security, to better integrate 
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and synchronize the existing Department-level strategies and ensure their 
effective and efficient implementation. 
Here for example are the strategic goals of the USCG (2002): 
• Maritime Safety  
Eliminate deaths, injuries, and property damage associated with 
maritime transportation, fishing, and recreational boating.  
• Maritime Security  
Protect our maritime borders from all intrusions by halting the flow 
of illegal drugs, aliens, and contraband into this country through 
maritime routes; preventing illegal incursions of our Exclusive 
Economic Zone; and suppressing violations of federal law in the 
maritime region. [This year the Coast Guard’s Strategic Plan will be 
updated to reflect Homeland Security.] 
• Protection of Natural Resources  
Eliminate environmental damage and natural resource degradation 
associated with all maritime activities, including transportation, 
commercial fishing, and recreational boating.  
• Maritime Mobility  
Facilitate maritime commerce and eliminate interruptions and 
impediments to the economical movement of goods and people, while 
maximizing recreational access to and enjoyment of the water.  
• National Defense  
Defend the nation as one of the five U.S. Armed Services. Enhance 
regional stability in support of the National Security Strategy, 
utilizing our unique and relevant maritime capabilities. (p. 21) 
The USCG has the same duty as the MMEA, which is to serve under the direct command 
of the Armed Forces as the fourth branch in the military in the event of war. This role is 
reflected in the USCG Strategic Goals in the subject of National Defense, which is 
protecting national security like the armed services that has been embedded in their 
additional functions as well. It explains and legitimates the need to work with the defense 
force when the need arises.  
Amongst the coast guards discussed in Chapter II, the ICG is the only 
organization that is placed under the Ministry of Defence as an agency specified to be 
part of the military branches. There are a few other coast guards that are also within the 
structure of the defense forces, which are entrusted to enforce the law and serve as part of 
the military branches (see Table 2).  
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Table 2.   Coast Guards as Part of Military Branches (from CIA, n.d.) 
Country Military Branches 
Antigua and 
Barbuda  
Minist ry of Nat ional Secur ity,  Royal Ant igua and Barbuda Defense Force 
(includes Ant igua and Barbuda Coast Guard) (2012) 
Barbados Royal Barbados Defense Force: Troops Command, Barbados Coast Guard 
(2011) 
Cabo Verde Armed Forces: Army (also called the Nat ional Guard, GN), Cabo Verde 
Coast  Guard (Guardia Costeira de Cabo Verde, GCCV; includes nava l 
infantry) (2013) 
Colombia  National Army (Ejercito  Nacional),  Republic of Colombia Navy (Armada 
Republica de Colombia,  ARC, includes Naval Aviat ion, Naval Infantry 
(Infanteria de Marina,  IM), and Coast  Guard),  Colombian Air Force (Fuerza 
Aerea de Colombia,  FAC) (2012) 
Comoros Army of Nat ional Development  (l’Armee du Developpement  Nat ionale,  
AND): Comoran Security Force (also called Comoran Defense Force (Force 
Comorienne de Defense,  FCD), includes Gendarmer ie),  Comoran Coast 
Guard, Comoran Federal Police (2013) 
Croat ia  Armed Forces of the Republic of Croat ia (Oruzane Snage Republike 
Hrvatske,  OSRH) consists of five major commands direct ly subordinate to  a 
General Staff: Ground Forces (Hrvatska Kopnena Vojska,  HKoV), Naval 
Forces (Hrvatska Ratna Mornarica,  HRM; includes coast  guard),  Air Force 
and Air Defense Command (Hrvatsko Ratno Zrakoplovstvo I Protuzracna 
Obrana),  Joint  Educat ion and Training Command, Logist ics Command; 
Military Police Force supports each of the three Croat ian military forces 
(2012) 
Dominica  no regular military forces; Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force 
(includes Coast Guard) (2012) 
Ecuador Ecuadorian Armed Forces: Ecuadorian Land Force (Fuerza Terrestre 
Ecuatoriana,  FTE), Ecuadorian Navy (Fuerza Naval del Ecuador (FNE), 
includes Naval Infantry,  Naval Aviat ion, Coast Guard), Ecuadorian Air  
Force (Fuerza Aerea Ecuatoriana,  FAE) (2012) 
Georgia  Georgian Armed Forces: Land Forces (include Air and Air Defense Forces); 
separat ist  Abkhazia Armed Forces: Ground Forces,  Air Forces; separat ist 
South Osset ia Armed Forces 
note:  Georgian naval forces have been incorporated into the Coast  Guard, 
which is part  of the Minist ry of Internal Affairs rather than the Minist ry of 
Defense (2015) 
Grenada  no regular military forces; Royal Grenada Police Force (includes Coast 
Guard) (2010) 
Guyana  Guyana Defense Force: Army ( includes Air Corps, Coast Guard) (2012) 
Iceland  no regular military forces; Icelandic Nat ional Police; Icelandic Coast  Guard 
(2013) 
India  Army; Navy ( includes naval air arm); Air Force; Coast Guard (2011) 
Jamaica  Jamaica Defense Force: Ground Forces, Coast Guard, Air Wing (2010) 
Latvia  National Armed Forces (Nacionalo Brunoto Speku): Land Forces (Latvijas 
Sauszemes Speki),  Navy (Latvijas Juras Speki; includes Coast  Guard 
(Latvijas Kara Flotes)),  Latvian Air Force (Latvijas Gaisa Speki),  Latvian 
Home Guard (Latvijas Zemessardze) (2011) 
Maldives  Maldives Nat ional Defense Force (MNDF): Marine Corps,  Security 
Protect ion Group, Coast Guard (2010) 
Maurit ius  no regular military forces; Maurit ius Police Force,  Special Mobile Force, 
Nat ional Coast Guard (2011) 
Morocco  Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armees Royales,  FAR): Royal Moroccan Army 
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(includes Air Defense),  Royal Moroccan Navy ( includes Coast  Guard, 
Marines),  Royal Moroccan Air Force (Al Quwwat  al Jawyiya al Malakiya 
Marakishiya; Force Aerienne Royale Marocaine) (2010) 
Norway Norwegian Army (Haeren),  Royal Norwegian Navy (Kongelige Norske 
Sjoeforsvaret ,  RNoN; includes Coastal Rangers and Coast  Guard (Kystvakt)), 
Royal Norwegian Air Force (Kongelige Norske Luft forsvaret,  RNoAF), 
Home Guard (Heimevernet,  HV) (2013) 
Paraguay Armed Forces Command (Commando de las Fuerzas Militares): Army,  
Nat ional Navy (Armada Nacional,  includes Mar ine Corps,  Naval Aviat ion, 
and Coast  Guard),  Paraguayan Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Paraguay, FAP),  
Logist ics Command, War Materiel Directorate (2012) 
Peru Peruvian Army (Ejercito  Peruano),  Peruvian Navy (Mar ina de Guerra del 
Peru,  MGP; includes naval air,  naval infantry,  and Coast  Guard),  Air Force 
of Peru (Fuerza Aerea del Peru,  FAP) (2013) 
Saint  Kit ts 
and Nevis  
Minist ry of Foreign Affairs,  Nat ional Security,  Labour,  Immigrat ion, and 
Social Securit y: Royal Saint  Kitts and Nevis Defense Force (includes Coast 
Guard),  Royal Saint  Kit ts and Nevis Police Force (2013) 
Sao Tome 
and Principe  
Armed Forces of Sao Tome and Principe (Forcas Armadas de Sao Tome e 
Principe,  FASTP): Army; Coast  Guard of Sao Tome e Principe (Guarda 
Costeira de Sao Tome e Pr incipe,  GCSTP; also called “Navy”); President ial 
Guard (2013) 
Seychelles  Seychelles Defense Force: Army, Coast  Guard (includes Naval Wing, Air  
Wing),  Nat ional Guard (2005) 
Sri Lanka  Sri Lanka Army, Sr i Lanka Navy, Sr i Lanka Air Force,  Sri Lanka Coast 
Guard (2015) 
Taiwan  Army, Navy ( includes Mar ine Corps),  Air Force,  Coast  Guard 
Administ rat ion, Armed Forces Reserve Command, Combined Service Forces 
Command, Armed Forces Police Command 
Tanzania  Tanzania People’s Defense Force (Jeshi la Wananchi la Tanzania,  JWTZ): 
Army, Naval Wing ( includes Coast  Guard),  Air Defense Command ( includes 
Air Wing),  Nat ional Service (2007) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  
Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force (TTDF): Trinidad and Tobago Army,  
Coast Guard, Air Guard, Defense Force Reserves (2010) 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Arab Emirates Armed Forces: Crit ical Infrast ructure Coastal Patrol 
Agency (CICPA), Land Forces,  Navy, Air  Force and Air Defense,  
President ial Guard (2015) 
United 
States 
United States Armed Forces: U.S. Army, U.S. Navy ( includes Mar ine Corps), 
U.S. Air Force,  U.S. Coast  Guard; note -  Coast Guard administered in 
peacet ime by the Department  of Homeland Security,  but  in wart ime reports 
to the Department  of the Navy (2013) 
Venezuela  Bolivar ian Nat ional Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bo livar iana,  
FANB): Bolivar ian Army (Ejercito  Bolivar iano, EB),  Bolivar ian Navy 
(Armada Bo livar iana,  AB; includes Naval Infantry,  Coast  Guard, Naval 
Aviat ion),  Bolivar ian Military Aviat ion (Aviacion Militar Bolivar iana,  AMB; 
includes Air Nat ional Guard),  Bolivar ian Nat ional Guard (Guardia Nacional 
Bolivar ia,  GNB) (2013) 
Vietnam People’s Armed Forces: People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN; includes 
Vietnam People’s Navy (with Naval Infantry),  Vietnam People’s Air and Air  
Defense Force, Border Defense Command, Coast Guard) (2013) 
Malaysia Malaysian Armed Forces (Angkatan Tentera Malaysia,  ATM): Malaysian 
Army (Tentera Darat Malaysia),  Royal Malaysian Navy (Tentera Laut Diraja 
Malaysia,  TLDM), Royal Malaysian Air Force (Tentera Udara Diraja 
Malaysia,  TUDM) (2013) 
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Taylor (2000) defined good governance as “the responsibility and accountability 
for the overall operation” of an organization. He also explained that unity of command, 
unity of direction, and unity of accountability are keys to success. As cleverly stated by 
Klitgaard & Light (2005),  
Every agency has—or should have—a clear mission with structures and 
processes that follow from their particular responsibilities. With rare 
exception, agencies with related mandates should fit together in a broad 
organizational scheme that permits and encourages constructive 
interaction rather than battles over turf. Federal departments should be 
reorganized to bring together agencies that contribute to a broad mission 
in a manner responsible to direction from elected leaders and their 
appointees, and subject to careful oversight by Congress but sufficiently 
independent in administration to achieve their missions. (p.29) 
Frumkin (2003) said, “There is a natural attraction to the idea of combining 
services and resources, particularly during times of fiscal constraints or following 
operational crises.” These five areas, if given careful attention, may become catalysts to 
success in merging government agencies: (p. 4) 
1. Choosing targets wisely. Frumkin (2003) said, “Not all public 
agencies with overlapping responsibilities are ripe for merger or 
consolidation.” (p. 4). First, the missions must be compatible and fit 
between culture and competencies. Therefore, as for the MMEA 
condition, we can see the missions under the PMD are not the same as 
theirs, let alone the culture where the MMEA are law enforcers, which 
have been filled up with people mainly from the Royal Malaysian Navy, 
as a branch in the military. 
2. Communicating effectively. Mergers create anxiety and fear 
among both employees and stakeholders. According to Frumkin (2003), 
“it is critical for leaders to communicate early and openly.” (p. 4) 
Communicating applies to vertical and horizontal reporting. Under certain 
circumstances, communicating to the head with the right mind will help in 
getting problems solved. 
3. Implementing quickly. It is often tempting to assume that “going 
slow” will ease the stress of a merger on employees and stakeholders. 
However, experience shows that moving quickly with important 
operational changes—such as payroll, travel, and new logos—”is critical 
to building momentum and moving toward normalization” (Frumkin, 
2003) (p. 4). The PMD has done such a great job in initializing the 
MMEA, but it is time to let the agency be under the right command in 
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order for it to competently grow. With readiness, implementation under 
the right ministry should not pose any hindrance to its success. 
4. Creating a new culture. “Mergers do not involve simple addition 
or deletion of agency features. The demand the creation of something 
new” (Frumkin, 2005) (p. 5). This step would require breaking away from 
routines, traditions, and customs. And it is crucial for the MMEA to 
receive the support from agencies within the ministry, once transition 
takes place.  
5. Adjusting over time. Implementing a merger often takes years after 
the initial wave of change. This situation deals not with a merger but with 
a change in the reporting structure; nevertheless, these areas could point 
the newly spearheaded MMEA in the right direction and make it a world-
class coast guard.  
In 2003, the GAO released a document entitled Results-Oriented Cultures: 
Implementing Steps to Assist Mergers and Organizational Transformations. The GAO 
(2003) also defined nine key practices that are central to successful mergers, acquisitions, 
and transformations. Merger is not the answer for this case; still, these practices could be 
implemented in the MMEA in the future: 
1. Ensure that top leadership drives the transformation.  
2. Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the 
transformation.  
3. Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the 
transformation.  
4. Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show 
progress from day one.  
5. Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process. 
6. Use the performance management system to define responsibility and 
assure accountability for change.  
7. Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 
report related progress.  
8. Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the 
transformation.  




B. THE MALAYSIAN MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AND 
PRESENT CHALLENGES UNDER THE PRIME MINISTER’S 
DEPARTMENT 
Taylor (2000) stated,  
For any organization to be strategically successful it is crucial that there be 
a high degree of strategic alignment, fit or congruence among the 
organization’s mission, vision, goals, strategy, structure, culture leadership 
style, resource deployment and investment, incentive system, skill sets, 
and performance measures. (p. 112–113) 
Any agency is under the responsibility of a ministry. It is clear that the role of 
departments is to implement matters and policies, as prescribed by the government, 
through their respective ministries. The responsibilities of each branch is to carry out 
tasks and activities related to official policies made by the ministry. This leads one to 
question why the MMEA, after being in operation for 10 years since its establishment in 
2005, is still placed under the PMD when the overall responsibilities are not operational 
in nature. The structure of the PMD, which consists of various agencies, does not reflect 
the clear chain of command of an operational agency, which requires direct supervision 
for command and control. The PMD is a body that initiates new policy and oversees 
overall development that benefits the nation. It is obvious why the MMEA was placed 
under PMD during the initiation stage, which contributes significantly to its effectiveness 
and successful establishment in the present day. However, the question now is where it 
rightfully belongs. The aspiration of the federal government, through launching the 
National Blue Ocean Strategy, and the implementation of government transformation 
programs could, be used to review the present reporting structure of the MMEA. 
Agencies that share same responsibilities could profitably be combined under same 
organization to expedite decision-making and for better utilization of operational 
resources. 
It will never be easy for the MMEA, even though it has been in operations since 
2005, to make comparisons of the MMEA’s efficiency with other agencies, particularly 
the Marine Operations Force (MOF), which has previously done the same thing in the 
area of law enforcement. In addition, the present personnel, from the director general to 
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most positions in the MMEA, are made up of former officers from the Royal Malaysian 
Navy, even though the core competency required for these two organizations is 
asymmetrical. Subsequent to the establishment of the MMEA, there were a few instances 
when the MMEA was not getting the necessary cooperation from other operational 
agencies, including the Armed Forces, in what could be termed as reporting-structure 
pandemonium.  
1. Checks and Balances 
In the federal administration system of Malaysia, the prime minister holds 
executive power of the state to become the head of government. The prime minister has 
the prerogative to appoint any qualified persons to become ministers in his Cabinet to 
make up the government. All government agencies are placed under their respective 
ministries, with ministers as the head who are assisted by secretary generals appointed 
from the Civil Service to manage and effectively administer the core functions of the 
ministry.  
The Armed Forces are under the Ministry of Defence, and together with agencies 
such as the Veteran Affairs Department, National Service Department, and other smaller 
divisions, they formulate defence policy, strategic management, and general management 
functions. There are also some other ministries, such as the Home Affairs Ministry, to 
handle internal security and peaceful order of the country through agencies such as the 
police, the Immigration Department, the National Registration Department, and others as 
listed in Chapter II. These departments are placed in their respective ministries in this 
compartmentalized structure to undertake the core functions named after the ministries 
for greater effectiveness in achieving the government’s vision and aspiration to best serve 
the Malaysian people.  
The prime minister chairs the weekly Cabinet Meeting attended by all ministers 
and the chief secretary of the government in his capacity as secretary of the Cabinet, who 
is also the highest ranked officer in the Civil Service. Subsequent to the weekly meeting, 
all ministers chair the post–Cabinet Meeting with the top management officials of the 
ministry as a reflection on how the federal government system works. The element of 
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checks and balances within the executive branch of the federal government is led by the 
minister, who supervises the agencies placed in the ministry. This is done to enhance the 
efficiency of the government machinery based on the specific core function of the 
specific ministry, either Defence, Home Affairs, Transportation, or other names given to 
the ministries. 
Departments that do not fall under the clear structure of a ministry’s core 
functions, such as the central agencies, are placed directly under the PMD and also have 
minister portfolios within the PMD as the minister in-charge. Parliament, as an 
organization, is an example of this, which has the MMEA placed under the supervision of 
a minister in the PMD. It is so obvious that Parliament and the MMEA have no 
significant relation in their roles and functions for them to be placed together, reporting to 
the same minister of the PMD. After its inception in 2005, the MMEA was under the 
supervision of the deputy prime minister, who was coincidently also the then-Minister of 
Defence. However, he was later appointed as the Sixth Prime Minister of Malaysia in 
2009, and the new deputy prime minister was the Minister of Education. Under these two 
ministers, the MMEA was not regularly represented by the director general in any of the 
post–Cabinet Meetings, who occasionally attended only when required to by the deputy 
prime minister. Nevertheless, in order to have a role in the ministry, the PMD established 
the MMEAD together with the MMEA under the PMD. But the director general of this 
new division has no supervisory role over the MMEA, unlike of those departments under 
the specific ministries. The ministry role of the MMEAD is limited to coordinating 
applications for the Development Expenditure to Treasury and Economic Planning Unit, 
to acting as secretariat for all acquisition processes such as tender bidding, to creating 
documentations and signatory of contracts. The role to formulate maritime policy, as 
done by all policy divisions in all respective ministries, could not be done by the 
MMEAD because of the structure separation between them and the MMEA within the 
PMD, as illustrated in Figure 1.   
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2. The Pivotal Search and Rescue Mission of MH370 
The disappearance of flight MH370 in March 2014 put the MMEA in a secondary 
role instead of as the lead agency for SAR, as stipulated in their Mission and Vision 
Statement. The Minister of Defence, in his capacity as caretaker Minister of Transport, 
led the SAR operation. The fact that the MMEA is not placed in either of these two 
ministries does that mean it should have no direct involvement or be used in the SAR 
mission, implying the miniscule decision-making or importance the MMEA has in the 
matter. The absence of MMEA in the early stage of the rescue mission was also 
considered an operational flaw because the MMEA was not mentioned specifically in 
press conferences. 
The following is an excerpt from one of the press conference, as cited in the 
Straits Times (2014):  
Following further discussion up the chain of command, the military 
informed the Acting Transport and Defense Minister Hishammuddin 
Hussein at approximately 10:30 of the possible turn-back of the aircraft. 
The Minister then informed the Prime Minister, who immediately ordered 
that search and rescue operations be initiated in the Straits of Malacca, 
along with the South China Sea operations which started earlier in the day. 
During this time, KD Mahameru, the Mine Counter Measure Vessel and 
KD Laksamana Muhamad Amin, the Corvette Vessel of the Royal 
Malaysian Navy were already in the Straits of Malacca on patrol duties. 
They were immediately re-tasked to conduct the search and rescue 
operation. A military aircraft was then sent to join the two ships in the 
Straits of Malacca at 10:54 to search for MH370. 
The MMEA was left out in the rescue operation, and its director general released 
separate press statements to media team without going through the proper coordination. 
At a certain point, when the media was desperate for updates, a director from MMEA 
Headquarters released a statement televised live on the national TV that MMEA aircraft 
spotted an orange-colored object in the South China Sea, presumably from MH370, and 
the MMEA had dispatched a ship to further investigate on site; but the object turned out 
to just be a canvas. Such sighting, which has not proven conclusive in a tragedy of this 
nature, and which received worldwide coverage, should not be disclosed to media by an 
 48 
officer, even in his capacity as director from headquarters, without verification. 
Statements should be channeled through the SAR team led by a minister. 
In another sighting, which was also reported to the public and which could be 
interpreted as another public relations flaw, a local fisherman’s boat discovered a deflated 
life raft. The discovery was reported to the MMEA, and the fisherman’s boat managed to 
hold onto the deflated life raft while waiting for the MMEA to arrive at the scene. 
However, after the arrival of the MMEA, and as the personnel tried to recover it, the raft 
sank, and the pictures, as well as a video shoot of this incident, were published in 
newspapers and shown on TV news. Incidents such as this receiving public viewing only 
leads to further bad publicity after the MMEA was incapable in recovering the raft after it 
had been closely secured by the fisherman.  
The MMEA was sidelined because neither the director general and the minister in 
the PMD as the minister in-charge were performing in their respective chains of 
command. A mishap of this scale requires a joint operation. In another press conference, 
the MMEA seemed to be included in the rescue mission, but the only attendee was the 
deputy director general. However, the event was not led by the minister as the head of the 
SAR mission, but was chaired by only the Director General of Civil Aviation, making the 
press conference seem less importance and significant than a press conference normally 
was.  
Further speculation on this tragedy might not be accurate, but outsiders could 
conclude the role of the MMEA in rescue operations from these publicized incidents, as 
reported by the media, and make the MMEA more vulnerable to critiques.  
3. Sulu Separatists Intrusion 
Another case that received attention and which put the MMEA under the 
microscope was the intrusion of Sulu Separatists in the East Coast of Sabah. This incident 
lasted for several weeks at Kampung Tanduo in Lahad Datu and claimed the lives of 
eight policemen, two army personnel, and 68 separatists. This group came through the 
sea and managed to land without been detected by the Malaysian authority. The prime 
minister subsequently formed a special task force called Eastern Sabah Security 
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Command (ESSCOM), which consisted of Armed Forces and the Police Force, which 
was fortunately represented by MMEA officers. ESSCOM was placed under the PMD, 
probably for reasons similar to why the MMEA was placed under the PMD, and was 
headed by a director, who was from the Immigration Department of the MOHA. The 
director of ESSCOM lasted for only 15 months, at which point the prime minister 
reevaluated its effectiveness and decided to restructure this new agency, which has now 
been divided into a civilian entity and an enforcement agency led by a commander at the 
rank of deputy commissioner of police. However, the scenario is different because even 
as a commander, the head of this service scheme is the inspector general of police, who 
reports to the MOHA, even though ESSCOM is under the PMD. 
As reported by a media source in Malaysia, 
The Ministry of Defence is currently responsible for keeping the waters 
east along the 1,400 km that were previously the responsibility of the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Its minister Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid 
Hamidi said in a recent briefing, the Sabah waters controlled Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), will be placed under the 
responsibility of the ministry with the assistance of the Royal Malaysian 
Navy (RMN). (Awani, 2013),  
This is clearly to offset the MMEA, as if it is not able to carry out its duties whenever 
there is a huge problem; even when an issue is related to maritime aspects, the handling 
of the problem will be relinquished to another agency under a different ministry because 
there is not enough support within the PMD to handle such a complication. It is now 
questionable whether resources and enforcement can be fully maximized or realized if 
this trend continues. The MMEA should be given a chance to mature in this area, to grow 
like other long-established coast guards. Years in operation not only yields maturity but 
also the ability to solve all types of problems that arise in the future. To achieve that, it is 
strongly suggested that the agency be under a different ministry to help the MMEA 
develop through the right mixture of coordination and communication. This should work 
in horizontal and vertical ways, between agencies with similar interests, under the same 
apex, or moving towards greater efficiency and economies of scale.  
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter offers recommendations for making the MMEA more effective from 
the operational perspective, based on the organizational structure of the MMEA and its 
chain of command. The present reporting structure of the MMEA under the PMD has 
been found lacking coordination in its operational management approach, and weak in its 
organizational and reporting structure when it comes to a more effective allocation of 
resources, even after being in operation for 10 years.  
A. OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT APPROACH  
The MMEA has been given all necessary supports from the federal government to 
become a brand new government agency that enforces federal and international laws in 
the MMZ and carries out SAR operations. All the potential bureaucracies that could be a 
hindrance to the MMEA, established within the specified time framework, were 
successfully overcome with placement of the MMEA in the PMD, which is the most 
centralized and important ministry in the Malaysian Federal System. All the initiatives 
taken before the establishment of the MMEA prior to 2005 have managed to anticipate 
the potential resistance from the existing agencies in operation in the MMZ. Those efforts 
were also successful in understanding and planning the smooth managerial transition to a 
new government agency of the MMEA’s stature. However, from the operational 
perspective, the government had a tendency toward trial and error by not having an action 
plan to execute after the establishment of the MMEA. The aspiration of having an 
effective maritime agency does not end after the MMEA has been launched and is in 
operation, but it has to be assessed in determining the MMEA’s effectiveness from the 
operational perspective, subsequent to the establishment. 
The operational management approach has to cover the effectiveness of the 
standard operating procedures (SOP) and the director general’s standing instructions 
(DGSI). This gives an assessment to better understand any flaws from these two vital 
operational documents. Additionally, the operational management approach has to 
encompass all agencies in the area of operations, both within the Malaysian government 
 52 
system and in the littoral states. Having the neighboring maritime agencies could ensure 
inclusiveness and improve operational effectiveness because the enhanced cooperation 
involves efforts to manage transnational organized crime (TOC), such as acts of 
terrorism, or even contrabands and drugs-related crimes.  
Being in operation and the MMEA’s presence in the maritime domain does not 
necessarily justify its effectiveness. The determining factor in gauging the MMEA’s 
effectiveness could not be concluded even by publishing all statistical data for all 
previous operations, or even by showcasing achievements of high profile cases. Instead, 
the government has to review the operational perspective of the MMEA in order to revisit 
the aspirations behind the establishment of the MMEA. It is impossible for the MMEA, 
as an operational agency, to function on its own. Moreover, when a previous enforcement 
agency, such as the MOF, has been withdrawn, the area of operation left an operational 
gap, a result of making the MMEA the sole agency for law enforcement in the MMZ. The 
MMEA has to build on operational capability by establishing a link with other 
operational agencies and all stakeholders in the maritime domain, the area of operations.  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL AND REPORTING STRUCTURE 
Law enforcement and SAR are the main functions of the MMEA, which is 
considered a relatively new agency, even after celebrating its 10th-year anniversary in 
2015. The MMEA needs the continuous support of the government. The following 
aspects are seen as the crucial parts in achieving the success of making the MMEA a 
more credible force: 
• Organizational Structure: The MMEA’s structure, which puts the director 
general as the head of the organization, has to expand. Placing the MMEA 
under the PMD does not enable checks and balances to monitor the 
MMEA’s performance and effectiveness. The structure has to be expanded 
beyond the MMEA, putting it as a division within an organization at a 
macro level.  
• Reporting Structure: Placing the MMEA under an operational ministry 
(such as the MOHA, which has the police force as law enforcement) with 
other related agencies with which the MMEA can work closely (such as 
the Immigration Department) will benefit Malaysia as a whole. The 
confusion in operation area and jurisdiction between the MMEA and MOF 
can also be overcome. The duplication and overlapping duties between the 
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MMEA and MOF, which share similar functions, can be resolved 
indefinitely. Command and control in the event of natural disasters needs 
to be clearer and more objective. This improves accountability and 
enhances professionalism of the MMEA when the director general of the 
MMEA reports directly to the Minister of Home Affairs, who is the 
Cabinet member at the highest executive power in the government 
administration. With the availability of the MMEA’s superior and more 
advanced assets, all operations for human assistance and disaster relief 
missions, which has been receiving greater significance, can be leveraged 
further. Management of SAR operations, which depends highly on 
mobilization of assets, can be improved with the centralization structure 
and unified command. The Minister of Home Affairs will be able to better 
manage Malaysia’s homeland security, which includes maritime 
boundaries, to improve on force capability and response time. The success 
of law enforcement is always the outcome of efficient intelligence-
gathering and sharing, which at the moment is the core competence of the 
Police Force, under MOHA, which fights and prevents ever-evolving and 
challenging crimes.  
• Resource Management for the MMEA’s Operations: Planning for resource 
allocation and management for the MMEA under a specific operational 
ministry such as the MOHA will enhance the efficiency and scarcity of 
resources. Appropriation of financial resources will be more efficient 
within the MMEA as an operational agency, and within MOHA as the 
respective ministry within the Federal Government system.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A strong workforce comes from having the right people with the right 
skills in the right place at the right time. Only then will government 
operate in an effective, efficient, and economic manner.  
–U.S. Senator Daniel K. Akaka (n.d.) 
 
Maritime security today has gone beyond just ensuring the safety of borders, 
though many crimes and threats are related to the invasion of the border. Maritime 
stakeholders are now under threat of such problems as piracy, robbery, illegal trafficking, 
and smuggling. These things pose a danger to the economy and eventually to national 
security. An article from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; 2011), 
“Alliance Maritime Strategy,” summarizes the importance of maintaining maritime 
security:  
The oceans connect nations globally through an interdependent network of 
economic, financial, social and political relationships. The statistics are 
compelling: 70% of the Earth is covered in water; 80% of the world’s 
population lives within 100 miles of the coast; 90% of the world’s 
commerce is seaborne and 75% of that trade passes through a few, 
vulnerable, canals and international straits. The maintenance of the 
freedom of navigation, sea-based trade routes, critical infrastructure, 
energy flows, protection of marine resources and environmental safety are 
all in Allies’ security interests. At the same time, the world’s oceans and 
seas are an increasingly accessible environment for transnational criminal 
and terrorist activities, including the transport and deployment of weapons 
of mass destruction and associated materials. 
This shows that there is no other way to describe the growing importance of upgrading 
the nation’s coast guard resources and responsibilities.  
In this research, the author studied four different countries’ coast guards in order 
to look at the best suitable organizational structure for the MMEA to emulate. The author 
discovered that the coast guard does not need to be a government agency because the 
CNZ can effectively runs as a voluntary agency, self-sustainable due to the contributions 
made by the general public for services rendered. The CNZ’s role is to conduct SAR 
operations, with its only purpose that of saving lives at sea, which is common for an 
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island state surrounded by the sea. Nevertheless, by not associating the CNZ with the 
government, the CNZ is not able to enforce the law, which historically has been the core 
business of coast guards all over the world. Other than the CNZ as a voluntary body, the 
MNZ is the other entity that is part of New Zealand’s government with the role of 
providing and maintaining navigational facilities, such as lighthouse and beacons for 
seafarers.  
The other three coast guards the author studied are from the United States, Japan, 
and India, which all have very distinct coast guards. The USCG, which was previously 
under the DOT, is now under the command of the DHS. The U.S. government felt the 
need to consolidate all security agencies under a specific federal department after the 9/
11 attacks. Therefore, the approval of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 clearly showed 
the seriousness of potential threats that are now possible in many kinds and forms. 
Together with USCG are 22 other security-related agencies, such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), United States Secret Service (USSS), and others, all under the DHS, which is very 
similar to the structure and agencies under the MOHA. The decision to restructure and 
have all security-related agencies under the DHS helps the U.S. government manage 
homeland security subjects effectively and efficiently to improve on resource 
management. Even as an agency under the DHS, the USCG is under the command of the 
DOD in the event of war; it is also the requirement for the MMEA to be placed under the 
MOD during times of war.  
The JCG, on the other hand, is placed under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport, and Tourism, which is essentially the second largest ministry in Japan, after 
the Ministry of Defense. This ministry was formerly known as the Ministry of Transport, 
but it changed the name just recently to reflect the diversification of functions in the 
Japanese government. Both the USCG and JCG are model agencies used by the MMEA 
prior to its establishment.  
There are other coast guards that are under their respective ministries of defense, 
and in operation together complement their Naval forces. The ICG is an example of this, 
where its operations are to support the Indian Navy, and the director general, who is 
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attached from the Indian Navy and who also reports to the Indian Minister of Defence. 
The author discovered that the justification for the ICG to be placed under the Ministry of 
Defence is due to its long coastline, vast operational area in the maritime zone, and 
maritime boundaries that India shares with seven neighbors.   
After carefully studying and analyzing the USCG, JCG, ICG, and CNZ, the 
author believes that the similarities shared between the MMEA and USCG, and also the 
MOHA and DHS, can be extended further based on the recommendations made in 
Chapter IV. The security threats are evolving and ever challenging, thus requiring the 
conventional intelligence gathering and interdiction for counter-measure efforts by a 
dedicated ministry specifically for this utmost important reason.  
Therefore, the author sees the importance in putting the MMEA in the right 
framework for better effectiveness. Being under the MOHA stresses the importance of 
better ways in managing the flow of information, disseminating that information and 
resources between agencies, and not falling under the complexity of bureaucracy. As 
stated previously, crime beginning at sea eventually end on land. The joint collaboration 
and greater cooperation between all agencies under the MOHA can prevent transnational 
crimes that could jeopardize Malaysia’s peace, public order, and security. This is surely 
the utmost aspiration of the Malaysian government’s call for maintaining what is in the 
“MMEA Act of 2004 (Act 633), Section 17”8 (Attorney General’s Chamber, 2006). 
                                                 
8 Notwithstanding any provisions of this act or any other federal law, the Agency, or any part of the 
Agency as may be determined by the Minister, shall be under the general command and control of the 
Armed Forces of Malaysia during any period of emergency, special crisis or war. 
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